Arguments for and against Moral Relativism

In all fairness, I have never heard an effective refutation of Moral Relativism better than this one. This looks at the pro side and the con side. It establishes how misconceptions about Moral Relativism can lead to misinterpretations of what Moral Relativism is. In truth, Moral Relativistic behavior practiced on a consistent basis is what we know in society as a Sociopath. If one is to behave consistently as a Moral Relativist, this would be the case. I have never heard anyone who agreeably acknowledges that Moral Relativism should be practiced on a consistent basis, though many excuses of self-denial to promote this type (I'm just being human, I don't always agree with Moral Relativism). The problem is then, are you truly a Moral Relativist? I'm being human too, and I'm a moral objectivist. So does being human imply being a moral relativist? Absolutely not. We shall take a closer examination of these arguments.

Arguments for and Against Moral Relativism
Arguments Against Moral Relativism
This section of the site considers arguments against moral relativism. Moral relativism makes cross-cultural comparisons impossible, makes a nonsense of the idea of moral progress, and views the great reformers that have brought about moral progress as morally bad. Each of these absurd conclusions of moral relativism shows that moral relativism is false.
Cross-Cultural Comparisons



To make cross-cultural comparisons, we need cross-cultural standards; cultural relativism, though, is nothing more than the view that there are no such things. Cultural relativism therefore makes cross-cultural comparisons impossible; we cannot judge one culture to be either morally superior or inferior to another. Some such judgements, though, are valid, and there must therefore be cross-cultural standards. Cultural relativism must therefore be false.
Moral Progress
Not only does moral relativism entail that we cannot make legitimate moral comparisons of different cultures, it also entails that we cannot make legitimate moral comparisons of a single culture across time; we cannot judge whether a changing society is getting better or worse. Generally, though, we do think that we have made moral progress. Moral relativism, arguably, cannot make sense of this.
Great Reformers
Further, when we consider the great reformers that have helped to bring about those changes that we take to constitute moral progress, e.g. the abolition of slavery, or granting the working classes and women the right to vote, we generally think these reformers are moral exemplars. According to cultural relativism, though, these great reformers were bad people; they acted in opposition to the values of their particular cultural contexts.
The Argument from Disagreement
The argument from disagreement is the argument that the fact of moral disagreement implies moral relativism. If we look at the world around us, we find that different people and cultures have different, in some cases radically different, moral codes.



If there were one true morality then we would not expect to find this; rather, we would expect to find people in agreement, and a cross-cultural consensus on moral matters. The fact of moral disagreement thus implies that morality is a product of personal opinion or culture, that there is no one true morality.
Moral Disagreement is Exaggerated
One response to the argument from disagreement is to play down the extent of the moral disagreement in the world. There is, of course, some disagreement between cultures on moral matters, but what is really striking is not the extent of the disagreement but the extent of the agreement. The moral value of compassion, of mutual respect and assistance, have been almost universally recognised. Moral disagreement is not as great as we would expect it to be if there were no objective moral truths; in fact, there is enough of a cross-cultural consensus to suggest that there is some universal standard to which all people have access irrespective of their cultural background.
Disagreement Does Not Imply Relativism
Perhaps a more conclusive criticism of the argument from disagreement is the criticism that disagreement does not imply relativism. The argument from disagreement rests on the principle that disagreement implies relativism; it assumes that because different cultures disagree about morality, morality is merely a product of culture. There are many questions, however, about which there is widespread disagreement, but to which there are certainly objectively true answers.
For example, there was a time when the majority of people believed that the Earth is flat. As the scientific data came in, majority opinion changed, and we now know that the Earth is a sphere. There must, however, have been a time when opinion was divided on the subject, when an equal number of people adhered to each position.
This disagreement could have been used to argue that the shape of the Earth is a relative matter, that it is flat for those that believe that it is flat, and spherical for those that believe that it is spherical. Surely, it could have been argued, if the shape of the Earth were an objective matter then people would agree about it; disagreement implies relativism.
This argument would clearly have been flawed; disagreement does not imply relativism. If, though, disagreement does not imply relativism in the case of the shape of the Earth, then surely disagreement does not imply relativism in the case of morality. If it is possible for there to be widespread disagreement on questions to which there is an objective answer, then widespread disagreement on moral questions does not demonstrate that moral questions do not have objective answers.
The Argument from Flexibility
The argument from flexibility is the argument that it is only moral relativism that can explain why different people in different situations have different moral duties.



For any proposed moral rule (e.g. don’t kill, or don’t steal), there appear to be exceptions. Killing in self-defense, or theft in order to feed one’s starving family, are perhaps accepted. The dogmatic view that there are absolute moral rules therefore seems to be too simplistic; we should accept that morality varies depending on circumstances, that it is relative.
This Rests on an Over-Simplification of Morality
A natural response to this argument is to object that it rests on an oversimplification of morality. Yes, there are exceptions to the prohibitions on killing and stealing, but that does not show that there are no exceptionless moral laws; rather, it only shows that those particular laws have exceptions.
Suppose that an absolute prohibition on killing is proposed as a moral law: “Thou shalt not kill.” The argument from flexibility objects to this proposal, observing that in certain situations, for example, self-defense, or war, or euthanasia, killing is morally acceptable. It is naive to think that there are any moral absolutes, it suggests; life is more complicated than that. To recognise this, we should become moral relativists, accepting that morality changes to fit the circumstances.
The moral objectivist, however, can respond, saying that the moral relativist’s characterisation of moral objectivism is an oversimplification. Moral objectivists don’t hold that everyone ought to behave in precisely the same way irrespective of their circumstances. Rather, moral objectivists hold that everyone in relevantly similar situations has the same moral obligations. Who you are doesn’t make a difference to morality; morality treats everyone equally.
An absolute prohibition on killing may well not apply to everyone. Perhaps people defending themselves, or fighting a war, or acting in the best interests of a suffering relative, can sometimes be justified in killing. But the mere fact that “killing is wrong” does not always apply does not show that there is no rule that always applies. Why not modify the proposed rule to accommodate the exceptions to it; “thou shalt not kill” might become “thou shalt not kill except in self-defence”, for example.
If there are further exceptions to this moral rule, then the rule can be modified again. Eventually, when all of the exceptions have been written into the rules, we will have exceptionless moral rules, rules that apply to all people in all circumstances. These will be the absolute moral laws the existence of which moral relativism denies.
The Argument from Tolerance
The argument from tolerance attempts to establish that moral relativism is true on the basis that the alternative--moral absolutism--is intolerant.



We ought to be tolerant, the argument runs, but to morally criticise other cultures or individuals is intolerant. We should therefore recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate; we should become moral relativists.
The Argument is Inconsistent
The first problem with the argument from intolerance is that it is inconsistent.
On the one hand, it argues that there are no objective moral standards, that morality is a cultural or personal matter.
On the other hand, it repeatedly asserts objective moral claims: “we ought to be tolerant”, “we should recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate”, “we should become moral relativists”.
If moral relativism is true, then each of these claims is false; there is no objective duty to be tolerant.
If there is no objective duty to be tolerant, though, then how does the fact (if it is a fact) that tolerance requires relativism bear on the question of whether we should be relativists?
Moral Criticism is not Always Inappropriate
A second difficulty with the argument is that there are some occasions on which intolerance does appear to be appropriate.
If someone tries to steal your car, then you have every right to criticise them; you don’t have to stand back thinking that different people have different standards and that what’s wrong for you might be right for them.
A simple appeal to tolerance as a reason to be a relativist is therefore too simple; tolerance isn’t always a virtue.
Relativism is not Necessary for Tolerance
A further problem is that it is possible to be tolerant without being a relativist. What does it mean to be intolerant? What would count as intolerance towards someone with whom you disagree?
Certainly hurling abuse is intolerant, as is physical violence. It is much less clear, however, that believing that someone is mistaken is intolerant. Tolerance, plausibly, involves treating people with respect; it is not a matter of what one believes but rather of how one behaves.
One can believe that a person’s views are false, however, but treat them with respect anyway. It is therefore not necessary to be a moral relativist in order to be tolerant.
Tolerance is Only Possible for Objectivists
This point can be developed: not only is it possible for moral objectivists to be tolerant, it is actually impossible for moral relativists to be tolerant. This is because it makes no sense to talk of tolerating the views of those with whom we agree.
To be tolerant is to treat with respect those with whom one disagrees; tolerance requires disagreement. The relativist view that every diverse perspective is equally valid and should be recognised as such therefore not only fails to promote tolerance but even makes tolerance impossible.
If we accept that everyone is right, that every perspective is true, then we are not being tolerant. To be tolerant we must judge the views of others to be false, and then treat them with respect anyway.
We can only judge the view of others to be false, however, if we are moral objectivists. If anything, then, the virtue of tolerance supports moral objectivism, not moral relativism.